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DERIVER'S LICENSES:
AN ARGUMENT FOR ESTABLISHING A STATUTORY LICENSE FOR DERIVATIVE
WORKS

Robert J. Morrison*
"Iff have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders ofgiants."
- Sir Isaac Newton

Introduction
The above quote is most often credited to Sir Isaac Newton, but appropriately, evidence
suggests that he based it on the concept of standing on the shoulders of giants that was popular in
the Renaissance.' The quote is often used in scientific circles because it is a reminder that the
most famous work is built on essential works that came before it. Science progresses
evolutionarily rather than revolutionarily. Although the same is true of arts and culture, a similar
affinity for the concept is missing in artistic disciplines and copyright. Derivation is the engine
for progress in the arts, but the ignition key has been given to those least interested in its use.
Currently, the holder of a copyright has total control over whom, if anyone, may use that
work in making the next derivative progression. This right is given as an incentive for creation,
but it gives far more incentive to produce a single generation of works than a continuing culture
of evolutionary works. Removing the permission right, while keeping the right to receive
payment for use, would destruct many of the barriers to the creation of derivative works but still
give the earlier authors an incentive to create. The best way to strike that balance is to establish a
statutory, compulsory license for derivative works.
In this paper I argue that the current law is not properly balancing the interests of
copyright holders and the American public in the area of derivative works. To solve this
problem, I advocate a statutory license for the derivative work right based on existing statutory
licenses and trademark law. Part I examines the concept of derivative works and their unique
value to the progress of American culture. Part II reviews the current state of the law and the
creative community, finding both deficiencies and inspiration. Section A evaluates fair use as an
option available to the author of a derivative work and how it fails to enable her work. Section B
reviews the current use of statutory licenses in copyright law. Section C surveys the effect of
trademark law on derivative works and the problem of source confusion. Section D addresses
the psychic effect on authors of base works. Section E introduces an economist paradigm for
evaluating copyright law. Part III proposes the optimal elements and operation of a statutory
license for derivative works.

I.
* J.D.,

A Nation of Derivers

Emory University School of Law, Atlanta, Georgia (2005); B.A. in Philosophy and

Political Science, Emory College, Atlanta, Georgia (2002). I would like to thank Sara K.
Stadler, Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law for the assistance, support
and inspiration she provided. Also, I thank Kurt G. Kastorf for being my cicerone.
1For a more in depth discussion of the origin of the phrase visit
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/history/q0162b.shtml (last visited March 7, 2006)
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A. The What of Derivative Works
The right to "prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work" is an exclusive
right of the copyright holder in Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 2 Like the other
Section 106 rights, the derivative work right is just as restricted and automatic. Only the
copyright holder can prepare or authorize a derivative work. "Derivative work" is a term defined
in the statute.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted.
A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications that, as a whole, represents an original work of authorship is
a "derivative work".3
This right extends the copyright owner's reach past copiers who reproduce the
work in whole or in substantial part in the same medium. The derivative work right also expands
the copyright
4 holder's rights beyond mere copying because the deriver's use does not even need
to be fixed. In fact, the derivative work does not need to be protectable to infringe the copyright
on the base work. In Kalem Co. v. HarperBros.5,the Supreme Court found that the movie, Ben
Hur, infringed the novel, Ben Hur, despite the fact that copyright law did not protect movies at
that time. However, a derivative work must meet the requirements for copyright protection
under Section 102(a) for it to be protected by copyright.6
Section 1037 specifically states that derivative works are capable of being
protected by copyright under Section 1028. This is consistent with the copyright scheme as 17
U.S.C. Section 101 defines a derivative work as "a work"; therefore it should be treated the same
as other works under copyright. The limit of that protection is that the derivative work owner's
rights do not include the portion of the base work that has been incorporated into the derivative
work unlawfully. 9 In fact, the copyright in the derivative work never extends to the portion of
the work that incorporates the material from the base work, but only extends to the new
material.1 0 This keeps the base work author's rights fixed and rewards only the creativity in the
derivative author's additions.
The right to prepare derivative works is a clear statement that Congress wants to
provide copyright holders the sole right to exploit the peripheral markets for a work. The
clearest value of a derivative work to the copyright holder is the ability to reach new markets.
Translations are primarily made so that the work can be sold in different countries. Television
and film adaptations are designed to capture not only those who read the novel, but also those
who had no interest in reading the book.
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000 Supp. 2).
3 17 U.S.C. § 101.
4 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
5 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911).
6 17 U.S.C. § 103.
2

7

id.

U.S.C. § 102.
9 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
10 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
11See Douglas Y'Barbo, Aesthetic Ambition Versus Commercial Appeal: Adapting Novels to
8 17
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Derivative works incorporate the base work, but they build upon the base work by
recasting, transforming, or adapting it. A derivative work is often more creative than the base
work. Even the derivative works that might seem rote can be hiding a substantial amount of
creativity. Adaptation of a novel for television or film often requires editorial revisions or even
entire new scenes, locations, or characters. Even mere translations call for some creativity
because the translator is not just changing the words, but sometimes the cultural references and
themes when the new market does not understand the market for which the original author
created the base work. 12
The derivative work must differ from the base work, or it is merely a reproduction.
Courts, however, differ on how much change is required to produce a derivative work. Judge
Posner, in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,'3 held that the derivative work must be "substantially
different" than the base work to be protected.' 4 This was to "prevent overlapping claims."' 5
When the base work is in the public domain, making a derivative work does not require
permission from the author of the base work; the substantial difference requirement, however,
would prevent someone accused of copying the derivative work from defending himself by
claiming to have copied the base work.' Alternatively, in Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment
Co.,17 the Second Circuit held that smoothing the lines of a sketch to give it a "cleaner look"
made a protectable, new work despite not having "a different aesthetic appeal" from the base
work. 18 The Second Circuit also held in Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc. 19 that

only something more than a merely trivial variation was required,20 which could occur
accidentally.

B.

The Why of Derivative Works

"More than ever, I believe in the permanence of any well-founded institution which recognizes and caters
to the basic needs of the people, spiritually as well as materially. And in my opinion, entertainmentin its
broadestsense has become a necessity rather than a luxury in the life of the American public."
-Walt Disney

Film and the CopyrightLaw, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 299 (1998).
12 In Int'l Film Exch. Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), and
Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 526-7 (E.D.N.Y. 1965), the
courts held that the translated works were entitled to copyright protection distinct and
independent of the base work. Cf Signo Trading Int'l., Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp. 362, 364-65
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that a translation from English to Arabic was a mechanical process.).
"3698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
14 Id.at 305.
15 Id.at 304.
16 id.
17 697

F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982).

BId. at 34-35.
19 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
20
Id. at 103.
21 Id.at 105.
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Derivative works are uniquely valuable to copyright policy, as they are specifically suited
to the goal of progressing science and art. A derivative work has a much shorter gestation period
than an original work because it need not begin from scratch. Additionally, a derivative work
will always have a relationship to contemporary culture, as it incorporates the culture of the base
work. Cultural development is not an individual effort, nor a chain of solo works. Culture
progresses in parallel, distributed paths.
Courts have long recognized the unique value of derivative works to culture.
Supreme Court said,

The

From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts...," [flor as Justice Story explained, "in
truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in
an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature,
science and art, borrows, 22and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before."
The Second Circuit said, "From the earliest days of the [fair use] doctrine, courts have
recognized that when a second author uses another's protected expression in a creative and
inventive way, the result may be the advancement of learning rather than the exploitation of the
first writer."
In addition to being faster or less costly to produce, derivative works increase access to
information. When a book is translated into another language or adapted into a different
medium, like television, knowledge is spread over a wider audience by reducing the cost of
exposure. Relying on the author of the derivative work will not give the identical experience of
the base work to the new audience. This is good, however, because the derivative work will not
displace the market for the original, and it is still valuable24 as a cheap starting point of broad but
shallow knowledge that will benefit a majority of society.
On the other hand, the operation of a derivative work necessarily involves copying,
especially for parody. At one initial glance, the idea of a derivative work could be seen as going
against the idea of copyright. Copyright is mostly understood as preventing or punishing
copying. This impression is based on a false but entirely understandable perception of the
purpose of copyright. Copyright's raison d'etre is not to prevent copying. Preventing copying is
just a means to achieve the true purpose of copyright. "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."'
Copyright
protection is a carrot, tempting authors to make artistic works for the public.
While the copying involved in derivative works is not a violation of the purpose of
copyright, it does remove some of the core value that encourages the creation of new works.
22

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8

F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436)).
23 Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1986).
24 As an example of a cheap yet valuable, broad but shallow, source of information
that still
satisfies the needs of most people, see the World Wide Web.
25 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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Because of this, caution is warranted. The goal must be to capture as much of the unique value
of derivative works, by encouraging their creation, while removing as little of the incentive to
authors as possible.

II.
A.

The Current Law for Derivers

You Never Know What You Will Find at the Fair!
'Fairuse' in America is the right to hire a lawyer. "
- Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.

Currently, the statute's most helpful provision to the author of the potential derivative
work is the fair use doctrine. This doctrine was initially a defense that the courts recognized was
necessary to give the public the access they needed to American art and culture. 26 The Supreme
Court described the purpose as this: "The fair use doctrine thus permits [and requires] courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
27 when, on occasion, itwould stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster."
The fair use doctrine is loosely described in Section 107 of the U.S. Code. 2 8 It is not
29
specifically defined, as it is designed to be an "equitable rule of reason," not a bright-line test.
The statute lists some examples of things that could be defended under the doctrine:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies3 0for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.
The statute includes the words "such as" and "including," making the list "illustrative and
not limitative." 3 1 Indeed this not only makes this list not exclusive, but also not inclusive. The
Supreme Court, noting that a news story, despite being listed in Section 107 as one of the types
of works to which it might apply, is not necessarily entitled to the shield of fair use, stated, "The
drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair
32
use, but structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis."
Thus, nobody can be sure in advance of creation, publication, or litigation that the fair use
doctrine will cover their work, as there is no set of fixed fair uses.

26 H.R. REp No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
27 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)).
28 17 U.S.C § 107.
29 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
30
31
32

17 U.S.C. § 107.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (citing H. R. REP.

No. 83 (1967)).
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To assist with each case-by-case analysis, Section 107 gives a list of "factors to be
considered."
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.3 3
Again, this is not a complete list; it is a list of factors that may be helpful in determining
if granting the fair use defense would serve the purpose of copyright. 34 "All are to be explored,
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright., 3 5 As the list is not
complete, courts are free to consider anything else that helps determine how to best serve the
purpose of copyright law. Because of this flexibility, "the factors thus tend to degenerate
into
36
post-hoc rationales for antecedent conclusions, rather than serving as tools for analysis."
Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises37 provides a good example of the
kind of indeterminacy the statutory factors can create. The Nation case involved the memoirs of
former President, Gerald Ford, a subject that included the controversial time where he succeeded
and subseuently pardoned Richard Nixon, who resigned in a legal scandal involving
Watergate.
Ford contracted with Harper and Row to publish the memoirs.39 The contract
included a "first serial right," which was sold to Time Magazine.4 0 The first serial right gave the
exclusive right to publish excerpts from the book in advance of the book's publication.
The
Nation, a political magazine, somehow got an advance copy of the memoirs and published
excerpts from it in The Nation magazine before Time Magazine published its excerts. About
300 words of the 2,250-word Nation story were copied verbatim from the memoirs.42 The Ford
book contained 200,000 words. 43 Having been beaten to the market, Time Magazine canceled
the article and exercised their contractual right not to pay the remaining money for the first serial
right.4 4
The Federal District Court denied The Nation's claim of fair use, stating that they had
taken the "heart" of the unpublished work in an attempt to make a profit.45 The Court of Appeals
reversed, stating that the public service of political
news reporting and the small amount of
46
material taken justified the protection of fair use.
33 17 U.S.C § 107.
34 Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).
35 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
36 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [A]
[5] (2004).
37 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
38
39

Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.

40 Id. at 542-3.
41

Id. at 542.

42

Id. at 545.

43 Id. at
44

579.

Id. at 543.

45 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072-73 (S.D.N.Y.

1983).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 723 F.2d 195, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983).

46

6 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 92

Copyright © 2006, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that fair use was not available to The
Nation. In applying the four factors from Section 107, the Supreme Court found that each factor
tilted in the favor of Harper and Row. The Court found that the intent of The Nation was to beat
their competitors to market with the story so that they would gain the financial benefit. 47 The
Court found that The Nation not only took the factual ideas of the work but also more than was
necessary to convey the facts, including the "subjective descriptions."
The Court upheld the
district court's finding that The Nation took a qualitatively excessive amount of the base work.49
The Court called the factor evaluating the effect of the new work on the market for the base work
"undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."50 The Court found that the article
in The Nation directly competed with Time Magazine's intended use. l
The dissent in the Nation case highlights the unpredictability of the fair use defense.
While the majority saw each fair use factor supporting Harper and Row, the three dissenting
justices saw all four factors supporting The Nation. Noting the inclusion of news reportin
among the listed examples in Section 107, the dissent found the purpose of the use appropriate.
The dissent saw the nature of the copyrighted work as one of high public value, which supported
The Nation dispersing the information.5 The dissent thought that the quantitative amount of the
base work taken was small, and the qualitative amount was appropriate for the purpose of news
reporting.5 4 Finally, the dissent drew a distinction between the effect on the market 5for
the
5
license sold to Time Magazine and the effect on all of the rights of the base work together.
The loose method of drafting Section 107 was designed to give legislative backing to an
existing judicial concept, while not removing any of the discretion courts needed in applying it to
"the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular
cases." 56 Unfortunately, this freedom at the time of litigation necessarily comes at the price of
predictability at the time of authorship. The potential author of a derivative work cannot be sure
if the work will be considered fair use until a court says so. Even in a case that would be "clearcut," the only way to take advantage of the fair use doctrine is to make the argument in litigation.
For this reason, some authors will decide that dependence on fair use will cost too much.5 Even
more stifling, some publishers won't distribute a work that is based on fair use.58
Beyond the unpredictably of the fair use defense, it is simply not engineered to cover all
derivative works. The factors that are to be considered remove massive portions of what would
qualify as a derivative work. Many derivative works are more commercial than educational, and
they could represent a competitor to the copyright holder. When evaluating the effect of the use
47 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561-3.
48 Id. at 563-4.
49
50

Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 591.
53 Id. at 604.
51

52

54 Id. at

598-603.
55 Id. at 602-3.

H.R. REP No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
57 For a collection of stories about how artists are dealing with fair use and licensing, see
56

LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2003).
58 See Judge Pierre N. Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard,103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,

(1990).
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on the commercial market for the base work, courts include all of the rights given under
copyright that the base work copyright holder is likely to use, including the Section 106(2)
adaptation right.5 9 Courts "must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to
the market for derivative works." 60 Given that displacing the value of the copyrighted work is
seen as the "single most important element of fair use,'' 61 the courts are not likely to extend fair
use to most types of commercial derivative works.
Also damaging to derivative works is the third factor, which has been interpreted by
courts as allowing the new author to use only the absolute minimum amount of the base work
necessary. The Supreme Court has held that a parodist is only allowed
to use enough of the base
62
work to "conjure up" the base work in the mind of the audience.
How much more of the work
can be referenced, if any, will depend on what is reasonable based on the character of the parody
and the market effect. This test is obviously limiting, and also clearly vague. Not only is the
concept of "conjuring up" indeterminate, but the test adds another layer of subjectivity when it
includes what is required to manipulate the mind of the audience member to this indeterminate
level. The mental operation of each audience member is unknown and inconsistent.
Given that the line between fair incorporation and infringement is so blurry and dim, and
that the person who will apply the test to determine if the artist will be faced with legal costs will
be the opposing party, it is likely that the ambiguity will be a deterrent to making the works.

B.

Statutory Licenses

"Take care to get what you like or you will beforced to like what you get."
- George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman
The concept of a mandatory copyright license already exists in the statute. The
idea behind a statutory license, or a compulsory license, is to reduce the transaction costs needed
to license out the work. Sans statutory license, the potential lessee must determine the current
owner, or owners, of a copyright, determine which rights she will need, and then negotiate a fee
for the use. This free market has the theoretical advantages of being faster to respond to specific
market forces, such as the public interest in a particular work, and being able to synchronize with
more unique factual scenarios. Unfortunately, such a market is also very cumbersome. The task
of finding the proper parties to negotiate with requires highly specialized skills and can take
months, if not years. 63 The potential lessee is forced to choose between delaying work on her
project while she searches or pays a specialist to search and negotiate, or simply not doing the
work as her muse directed, if at all.
Preliminary work on the project must be postponed until the licenses for the rights are
secured, as even incorporating the base work in preliminary activity is a violation of copyright.
In Disney v. Filmation,64 Filmation used the visual character Pinocchio from the Disney film in
preliminary materials, like storyboards, 65 for their movie, "The New Adventures of Pinocchio."
59 Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971.

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 566.
62 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994).
63 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (2005).
64 Walt Disney Prod. v. Filmation Assoc., 628 F.Supp. 871 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
65 Storyboards are something like a script for the visual element of a film. Resembling a massive
60

comic strip, storyboards have one sketch for each combination of the positions of the characters,
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The court held that these preliminary, internal uses still could violate the copyright owner's
reproduction right.66 The potential licensee can't comfortably use the base work in secret and
simultaneously take every opportunity to alert the owner of her desire to use it and negotiate for
the rights. The author must therefore choose between costly negotiation and the risk of being
caught. With a relatively small audience, she may see obscurity as a more viable and helpful
choice than legal use of the base work.
Another problem with the free market is that it isn't a level playing field. Large media
conglomerates hold most copyrights. 67 These corporations hold a large number of rights, as well
as the facilities to distribute them and create works from them. The very reason that they have
grown so large is so that they can make full use of the copyrights they hold themselves. The
insular nature of these conglomerates generally means that the transaction cost, which may deter
an independent artist if she is not able to afford it, is an equal deterrence to the large corporation,
despite their ability to pay. For the conglomerate to deal with many independent artists for
relatively limited licenses will cost more than dealing with one large company who will use the
work in many channels of distribution or just exploit it themselves. In other words, the
transaction costs are less efficient when dealing with small artists. The financial incentives
encourage the copyright holders to avoid independent artists and most derivative works.
Existing statutory licenses are designed to remove or reduce the transaction cost to
licenses. While this is immediately understood in terms of cost, it also has the effect of clearing
away the system that holds content stagnant in the hands of a consolidated company. The
statutory license removes the requirement of permission of the copyright holder.
Section 11168 creates a mandatory payment for the rebroadcast of local "over the air"
television, which cable systems were doing without payment thanks to a hole in the copyright
net. 69 While the cable license was designed to help the content owners get money, the satellite
statutory licenses enabled the home satellite providers to deliver the same television that cable
companies offered. Section 11970 creates a statutory license for nation-wide "cable" channels
and so called "superstations." Section 12271 creates a statutory license for broadcast into the
markets served by local area channels.
The cable and satellite licenses make it possible for customers to choose between new
content delivery systems without having to include the ability to access specific media in their
72
decision calculation. The idea was to level the playing field for cable and satellite providers.

camera, and lighting. The director and cinematographer will then use the storyboard as a guide
for filming.
66 Disney, 628 F. Supp. at 876.
67 Peter Johnson, Book Review: Can You Quote Donald Duck?: Intellectual Property in
Cyberculture Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship,
Appropriation,and the Law., 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 451, 460 (2001).
68 17 U.S.C. § 111.
69 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
70 17 U.S.C. § 119.
71 17 U.S.C. § 122.
72 See Carol J. Meriam, Validity, Construction,And Operation Of Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act, 179 A.L.R. FED. 347 (2002).
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Before the satellite licenses, satellite subscribers could73 only receive network programming if
they were out of the broadcast range of the local station.
Congress was more vocal about its motivation for the cable license than the satellite
licenses, but the effect on the large corporate copyright holders is clear. In addition to the
content created by Time, HBO, Warner Brothers, and New Line, the huge media corporation
AOL Time-Warner owns the WTBS "Superstation," CNN, TNT, HBO, TCM, NY1, the WB and
many other acronymic companies representing local and nationwide television networks
and
74
stations. Also, it owns Time Warner Cable, which serves 26 million homes in 33 states.
The statutory licenses in Section 11875 also ease access for public broadcasting and free
Internet radio "webcasters" who meet certain guidelines 76 from needing permission to play
copyrighted songs. All of these statutory licenses are used primarily by companies who are rebroadcasting something already put to tape. Although a movie shown on TV may be edited for
content, appropriateness, or scheduling reasons, the work is recorded in a certain way. This is
only a performance under the strained definition in copyright law. The work will be presented to
the viewers mostly as released by the author. There is another statutory license, however, which
gives the copyright holder less assurance about what the audience will see.
The "mechanical license" is contained in Section 115.7 This license gives any performer
the right to record and distribute a recording of any non-dramatic musical work already
released. 78 This is not a license to redistribute a recording, but it is a license to re-record the
musical work. 79 The importance of the distinction stems from the fact that a recording of a
musical work (the "Master Recording") and a musical work are separate works for the purpose
of copyright.8 0 The statutory license is an opportunity for an artist to use the musical work in
making a new recording with a new group of musicians. 81 The copyright holder gets a82fee for
the use of the work, but the holder does not have total control over the work that is made.

73 Andrew D. Cotlar, A Subsidy by Any Other Name: FirstAmendment Implications of the

Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, 53 FED COMM. L.J. 379, 380 (2001).
74 Time Warner Cable, About Us.
http://www.timewarnercable.com/corporate/aboutus/companyhighlights.html
November 15, 2006).

(last visited

75 17 U.S.C. § 118.

"To be eligible for the compulsory license, webcasters must be noninteractive, 17 U.S.C. §
114(d)(2)(A)(i), and cannot publish advance programming schedules, 17 U.S.C. §
114(d)(2)(C)(ii), or play more than four songs by the same artist in a three-hour period, 17
U.S.C. § 114(j)(13). Basically, only stations that pose little threat of substituting for record sales
qualify." Recent Legislation, CopyrightLaw - CongressResponds to CopyrightArbitration
Royalty Panel's Webcasting Rates. - Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1920 n.8 (2003).
77 17 U.S.C. § 115.
78 Id.
79 See Recording Industry Ass'n. of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.,
1981).
80 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 30.03.
76

81 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 8.04 [A].
82 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 8.04 [F].
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The mechanical license was created in response to the fear that exclusive licenses with a
company named Aeolian who made player-piano rolls would give them a "great music
monopoly." 83 Congress did not want a company's vast intellectual property holdings to dictate
the artistic direction of the country.
The person who makes a new recording under the statutory license has very limited but
very important rights. The Section 106(2) adaptation right is whittled away by the mechanical
license. Because the copyright is in the music, not the recording, the uniqueness of the first
musician's style is not part of the license. In fact, the statute specifically grants "the privilege of
making a musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or
manner of interpretation of the performance involved. 8 4 .
However, there are limitations. For instance, "the arrangement shall not change the basic
melody or fundamental character of the work., 85 This is intended to prevent the work from
being "perverted, distorted, or travestied., 86 The work made under the mechanical license
cannot stray too far from the original, as the musical group 2 Live Crew found out. 2 Live Crew
made a new work around the melody of Roy Orbison's song, "Pretty Woman," which was
owned by the company Acuff-Rose. 8" This new song changed the lyrics to something more
subversive, and the arrangement to something with stronger bass. 2 Live Crew initially paid
royalties under the mechanical license.8 8 Eventually, they conceded that they changed
the
89
"fundamental character" of the work and were not eligible for the mechanical license.
This lesser protection in the mechanical license means that the original artist can count on
the work being performed mostly as written, but it still gives the new performer all of the
ambiguity that falls between sheet music and a final performance. The new artist could make a
classic rock song into a flourished jazz song, or he could simply give it his own inimitable style.
This type of reworking has recently proven commercially successful when Johnny Cash and Ray
Charles both released "cover albums" near their deaths.
Another important limitation of the mechanical license over a right to prepare a
derivative work is in the protection afforded by copyright law. The recording made under the
mechanical license "shall not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title, except
with the express consent of the copyright owner."9 1 The artist using the mechanical license has a
right to sell the 92
recordings to the public for private use, but does not have the full rights of a
derivative work.
In addition to the limitations of rights granted by the mechanical license, the complexities
93
of the formalities required may dissuade an author from using it.
In fact, most of the reRIAA, 662 F.2d at 4.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
85 Id.
86 H.R. REP No. 94-1476, (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
7 Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1432 (6th Cir. 1992).
88 Id.
89 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 n.4 (1994).
90
JOHNNY CASH, AMERICAN IV - THE MAN COMES AROUND (American Recordings, LLC, 2002);
83

84

RAY CHARLES, GENIUS LOVES COMPANY

(Concord Records, 2004).

91 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
92

93

17 U.S.C. § 1 15(a)(1).
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 8.04[G].
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recording and rearrangements of songs are done under a consensual license from the owner.
This does not, however, reduce the importance of the statutory license's existence.
Although the availability of the compulsory license under the 1909 Act has been very
important to the structure of the recording industry, the statutory procedures for invoking
the license have rarely been used. The usual effect of the system is to make the statutory
royalty rate a ceiling on the price copyright owners can charge for use of their songs
under negotiated contracts: if the owner demands a higher price in voluntary negotiations,
the manufacturer can turn to the statutory scheme, but if the owner is willing to accept
less than the statutory rate, he is free to do so. Today, the vast majority of contracts for
use of
copyrighted musical works involve voluntary payment at precisely the statutory
94
rate.

The mechanical license is still useful to artists despite its disuse because it gives the
smaller artists leverage for negotiations. Knowing that they can fall back on the statutory license
makes permission a non-issue and gives a significant head start for determining a cost. For the
prospective user of the work, this eliminates a substantial amount of the transaction cost. Artists
who do not wish to deal with the broad strokes and complex operation of the mechanical license
are still supported by it. The mere presence of the statutory license levels the field, which is
precisely what statutory licenses are supposed to do through operation.
Having the power to set the de facto rate for statutory licenses comes with it a substantial
responsibility to do it right. If the rate is set wrong, it could frustrate the entire purpose of the
statutory license. If the rate is set too high or too low, it could make copyright a disincentive to
creation for both the future base work author and the future statutory licensee. If the license rate
is set too high, the licensee would have too much of the profit from the secondary use taken
away to make a living off that use. The creator of the base work would be receiving less money,
even though the licensee has the benefit of the base work's initial advertising cost, established
audience, and the ability to skip over the missteps made by the base work author. Alternatively,
a low royalty rate also puts the licensee on less comfortable ground. If the rate is too low, then
using the license turns into a race to market. A low rate will mean that more competitors could
afford to compete, potentially over-saturating the available market. This could make the area
unprofitable for all the licensees. If the over-saturation leads to a permanent loss of interest in
the subject by the audience, this would also hurt the base work author.
The task of using this power to set the rate is given to the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels 5(CARPs). The CARPs were created in the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of
1993.9
Congress reformed the perpetual Copyright Royalty Tribunals into oblivion and
replaced them with the ad hoc CARPs.
Section 801 gives the Librarian of Congress the power
to appoint and convene the CARPs. 97 The CARPs report their determinations to the Librarian of
Congress, who has three months to adopt, reject or modify the determinations. 9 8 This rate is
subject to judicial review. 99 The process of keeping the statutory licensing rates contemporary is
thereby placed in hands faster and more specialized than those of Congress.

94 RIAA, 662 F.2d at 4 (citations omitted).
95 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36,§ 7.27.
96

Id.

97

17 U.S.C. § 801(a).

98 See 17 U.S.C. § 802.

99 17 U.S.C. § 802(f)(1)(D).
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The statute gives
00 the CARPs the following objectives when adjusting the royalty rates for
the statutory licenses. 1
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public;
(B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright
user a fair income under existing economic conditions;
(C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the
product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening
of new markets for creative expression and media for their communication;
(D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and
on generally prevailing industry practices. 101
The statutory licensee is required to account for and pay the royalties to the base work
owner. 10 203 The CARPs do not enforce this duty, but they can serve as arbitration panels in a
dispute. 1
C.

The Trouble With Trademarks

"About the most originalitythat any writer can hope to achieve honestly is to steal with goodjudgment."
- Josh Billings

The immediate concern of most artists is the personal attachment they have to their work.
The fact that the Copyright Act gives the right to control derivative works grants copyright
holders the last word on how their creative expression is presented to the world. If a potential
derivative work author was not required to get the permission of the base work author, the base
work author would no longer be in total control. This is one of the most sympathetic arguments
artists have. Audiences will form a bond with some types of copyright expression more readily
than others. Sampling a music clip seems like copying, but taking a beloved character in a new
direction, against the wishes of the creator, seems more like heresy.
Because the public creates an emotional attachment to certain characters or places, they
are more concerned with the distortion of those characters. What if someone took the characters
in a new direction that was outside the plan for the series? What if someone went into the past,
telling a story of the genesis of the characters, which was outside of the canon? What if someone
with more deviant ideas took control?
First of all, the reality is that it already happens. Wherever there are characters that light
the imagination, there are new works created by the people whom they fascinate. Dubbed
"fanfic," a portmanteau word derived from fan fiction, the concept has flourished thanks to the

100 This applies to §§ 114, 115, 116, 118, and 119. Section 111 has special rules in 17 U.S.C.
§ 801(b)(2) that mostly limit the changes to matching inflation or adjusting to a change in policy
set by the Federal Communications Commission.
101 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1).
102 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3 6, § 8.04 [H] [ 1].
103 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 7.27.
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Internet's rock bottom barrier of entry for publication of text. 10 4 Fanfics can be what-if stories,
which change the underlying facts of a universe; or crossovers, where characters from entirely
different works meet; or just another chapter in the existing story. There are, of course, the more
blue stories as well. (This is the Internet after all.) This semi-obscure decentralized swap shop
of creative expression is unquestionably rife with copyright abuse; yet this form of expression
survives, presumably due to general disinterest. Most of the people who like the characters like
them because they were the product of the creator. Even the best fanfic can't hope to have the
same kind of legitimacy of the base works. If most people know that this is not the work of the
original author, they are naturally suspicious or dismissive. In short, they are smart consumers.
The intellectual property doctrines already have laws that protect the customer's right to
choose, and the customer's desire not to be deceived. Trademark law prevents the derivative
author from identifying his work with a mark that would indicate some other established
source. 10 5 This provides limits on derivative works, which would not be removed by a copyright
license. Happily, these limitations are very good at addressing author's concerns about the
control over their work.
Trademark law only finds infringement where the use would be likely to confuse the
purchaser. 0 6 This would not include a consumer deducing the origin based on the product itself,
but only based on the materials or labels accompanying the sale.
Where the item is not for
sale, or where there is no confusion, trademark law does not restrict the use. Applied to the idea
of derivative works of authorship, this would mean that either the derivative work is known to be
unofficial, or it is not being placed in commerce.
Making the unofficial status known is the most reasonable way to enforce a concern over
control of a character. The audience who wants to take a chance on a new author can do so,
while those who prefer only to expose themselves to the original author will know to skip it. If
the audience knows what is official and what is not, then there should not be any harm to the
reputation of the character - It "Didn't really happen." To give an artist control over how others
present the character is as overly broad as giving them control over how others discuss and
analyze the character.
In Dastar v. Fox, 10 8 The Supreme Court heard a case where the defendant Dastar edited
and sold videotapes from a TV series about World War II based on General Eisenhower's
book. 10 9 The derivative rights were licensed to Fox, who let the copyright expire and the work
fall into the public domain. 11 Dastar was accused of reverse passing off- misrepresenting

104

However, the idea is hardly new. Legend has it that Virgil's the Aeneid was a fanfic of

Homer's Odyssey. See Wikipedia, Fan Fiction, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fanfic (last visited
March 14, 2006).
105 Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
106 Pignons S. A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 486-7 (1st Cir.
1981).
107 See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores v.
Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989).
108 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
109 Id. at 25-7.
"1Id. at26.
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someone
else's product as his own.11 1 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act covers reverse passing
1 12
off.

The court found a distinction between indicating the origin of manufacture, and the origin
of the "ideas or communications that 'goods' embody or contain."' 1 13 While acknowledging a
potential distinction when dealing with a "communicative product," The Court decided that
consumers who buy a branded product do not necessarily believe that the company came up with
the idea. 114 The court dismissed the distinction for communicative works to avoid entangling
trademark with copyright, which already sets the limits of when the rights of the author
(including attribution" ) fall into the public domain.
Additionally the court was concerned
with the trouble in tracking the authorship of an uncopyrighted work.
The Supreme Court, in Dastar_ based its reasoning on the fact that Dastar used an
uncopyrighted work. 118 The Court specifically noted that the case where the new work credited
the author in a way that suggested sponsorship or approval (regular passing off) could be
trademark infringement. "9 Also, the Court noted that the separate clause of the Lanham Act that
outlaws misrepresenting the nature, characteristics, or qualities 2 0 of the new work would still
have operation.' 2 ' Presumably, when the copyright was still in effect this would outlaw anything
that made the consumer believe that the derivative work was made by or endorsed by the original
author, in addition to the regular passing off.
The latter way of avoiding trademark law infringement, not using it in commerce, is less
of a comfort to authors. If the derivative work is confusing, there really is some chance that the
audience would think the author's version of the world had gone in a direction it never actually
did and the author never intended. This problem is almost totally eliminated by the broad set of
activities that the courts have established qualify as "in commerce."12 2 All but the most private
and personal activities qualify.
While trademark law frustrates the free use of a known work in a derivative work, it does
it in a way that would satisfy the reasonable concerns about a system without any control by the
author. Generally, it is it best to keep as much division between the trinity of Intellectual
Property doctrines as possible to avoid unpredicted results from the combination, but here
trademark has already gone through evolution designed to balance the concerns of the artist and
public. It would be a good idea to utilize it where the same concerns appear again.
D.

Making an Omelet

111 Id.at 27. See supra at note 1 for a definition of reverse passing off.
112Id.at 30.
113 Id.at 31-32.
114 Id.at 33.
115 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
116 Dastar., 539 U.S. at 33.
117 Id.at 35.
118 Id
119 Id.at 36.
120 Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
121

Dastar,539 U.S. at 38.

122 Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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From the perspective of copyright holders, a mandatory license takes something away
from them. They no longer have the right to control who uses the work. Obviously, as we
already have statutory licenses, this isn't an illegal taking, but it still has the air of something
unfair or intrusive. It can appear that the government is forcing people to act in a way they don't
want to act. These concerns come naturally, but they come from a problem of perspective.
First, these concerns come from a flawed temporal perspective. A copyright is not the
inherent eternal right of all authors. If the copyright holder truly has something taken, it must be
something that was given not too long ago. The copyright can only come from Congress'
granting. The Supreme Court in Charles River Bridge, held that rights vested by law can be
divested retroactively by law.12
The temporal perspective problem is related to the second perspective problem: source.
The government is not the source of the copyright; it is only the mechanism by which it is
granted. The rights of copyright are not given by contract to the holder, but rather, they are
given by a desire to spur creative effort. This is clear from the Constitutional language: the right
belongs to the public, who offers it exclusively to authors for a limited time as an incentive to
create.
Connected to all of this is the misunderstanding of the nature of the right. A copyright is
not the same as a personal property right. If your perspective is not that someone owns a
copyright given by the government as a reward, but rather that someone has the copyright rights
given as an incentive by the entire American public to create and share 2 4 , then there are several
reasons for changing the nature of those rights.
The perspective change from copyright law, intending to benefit authors, to intending to
benefit the "progress of science and useful arts,"' 12 5 means that the law must be evaluated in light
of two conflicting goals. Authors must feel it is worth their time, but anything given that is
excessive for compelling authors takes away from the entire public for the benefit of one
company or person. From a utilitarian paradigm, it makes sense to serve the greatest number of
people. Even "taking" from one company would be preferable to taking from the public at large
without public benefit. As the goal is to maximize the amount of creative work produced and
exposed, reducing the rights in copyright is not a change in policy, but rather is a refinement of
the existing solution.
E. Econ 106(2)
If copyright law is to adjust, then the necessary question, is "when will changing the
rights in copyright law improve its ability to maximize creative production?" Because copyright
deals with authors and copyright holders through financial incentives, and we are concerned with
maximizing, it is common for someone evaluating a current or proposed copyright law to use an
economic analysis. The appeal of this paradigm is that it makes evaluating the public welfare
formulaic. The economist focuses on the money, which has the value of being a single,
quantifiable, and measurable variable. 12 6 While this paper can't give the broad concept of
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Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 539-540

(1837).
124 See Feist Publ'n v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
125 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
126 Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody,Fair Use, andEfficiency in Copyright Law,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 83 (1991).
6 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 102

Copyright © 2006, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

economic analysis its full due, it will utilize and criticize some of the basic ideas that have been
useful to the subject.
Under the economic theory, the government gives copyrights to authors because
otherwise the market would not allow authors to recoup costs of making new works of
authorship. This problem of laissez-faire capitalism is a market failure as the cost is likely
greater than the return, and thus authors would not receive enough return from natural market
forces to make authorship a financially rational act and the market will fail to induce new
12 7 In other words, the value that the market places on the original or official work in a
works.
world of legal
exact copies is not high enough.
Restricting access to the base works makes it more financially profitable for the base
work author, but restricting access adds to the cost of the derivative work as its author must
either pay for access or start entirely anew. 128 To reduce the cost of some derivative works, the
fair use defense theoretically removes the cost of using the base work.
In an economic analysis, derivative works that do not qualify for the fair use defense will
be made when the income from the derivative work exceeds the cost. Licensing the derivative
right from the author will just add to the cost. Assigning the derivative works right to the author
instead of keeping it with the public does not affect the likelihood of production of the derivative
work; it only affects the allocation of wealth. 129 Landes and Posner additionally argue that
taking the financial benefit from the author could delay introduction of the base work while the
author prepared
30 the derivative works for simultaneous release so as to capture the profit from
those as well. 1
There are two problems with this cost shifting analysis. First, it does not take into
consideration the concerns of authors which are not financial, but controlling none the less.
People do not always want to put things on the market. Authors often form emotional
attachments to their creations, which would inflate the price or even prevent rational evaluation
of a licensing offer.' 3 This is especially true when the derivative work would be critical of the
author or would damage the author's reputation.
Studies done on libel plaintiffs suggest that,
for many people, no amount of money can make ridicule worthwhile. 3 3 In this situation the
requirement of permission will always cause a market failure because the copyright will not be
given a value by the author that matches the market's value. To correct this, the requirement of
permission must be removed and the price must be set by someone other than the emotional
author.
Second, this analysis treats all derivative works as fungibles of equal value to society.
The value of a derivative work is not that it is merely an established thing recast, but that it is an
established thing recast by new hands. The addition of different minds is what adds to our
culture. A harmony (or even cacophony) of multiple voices will present the public with greater
range. After all, we've seen that the parody uses are certainly not going to come out of the
127
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original author. 134
perspective.

Or if they do, they can't be likely to have the same bite or outsider's

Additionally, Landes and Posner's objection is based on a world where the derivative
work author would owe the base work author nothing more than esteem. The critical question is
not who has the right, but to where the financial benefit will run. If others having the right to
make a derivative work still resulted in a profitable payment to the author (directly or through the
increased price of selling the copyright) there would be no financial reason to delay. Also
relevant is that the duration of a copyright starts when the work is fixed in a permanent medium
of expression. Delaying publication can reduce the exploitable life and thus the market value of
the copyright in the original work. 13 5 Authors must take this reduction in value into account
when deciding to delay publication of their work.
There is currently a market failure for derivative works. In cases where the consent is
denied because of emotional reasons, the failure is due to the permission requirement. In cases
where there would be permission or cases where permission is not required like fair use, there is
a failure in the fact that high transaction costs that stem from the uncertainty of the fair use
defense or the swarm of small users prohibit otherwise profitable uses. What is required is a way
to reduce transaction costs, eliminate the irrational denial of permission, and to set a price
guideline (which both reduces the transaction cost of negotiation and prevents prohibitively high
prices standing in as a functional equivalent of the irrational author's denial of permission).

III.

Deriving Directions

'I have always found that plans are useless, but planningis indispensable."
- Dwight D. Eisenhower
In proposing a compulsory license for "informational" works like databases, Professor
Ginsburg gave two primary justifications for a compulsory license. 13 6 First, it reduces the
transaction costs. 137 Second, and in her accurate opinion most importantly, it reduces the
monopoly power of a copyright so that the owner can restrict access. "Imposition of a
compulsory license reflects a legislative judgment that 1certain
classes or exploitations of works
38
others."'
.than
parties..
third
to
available
more
be
should
A statutory license for derivative works would remove the barriers of transaction costs
and permission. Derivative works are so important to the progression of American culture that
they should be available to third parties who want to exploit them. If derivative works were
properly defined, the incentive for artists would be minimally affected, and the potential
derivative works author would be able to rely on the statutory license more than on fair use. If
the statutory license gave a fair price, it would avoid the danger of delaying the base work for
economic reasons.
Id. at 103-06; See also, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
135 For works for hire, the copyright term is the shorter of 95 years from publication or 120 years
from creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
136 Though "informational works," such as databases, are not the same as derivative
works, some
of the reasoning and analysis of statutory licenses for putting old works to new use is applicable.
137 Jane C. Ginsburg, Creationand Commercial Value: CopyrightProtectionof Works of
Information, 90 Colum. L Rev. 1865, 1925 (1990).
138 Id.at 1926.
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For the purpose of the statutory license, a derivative work should be distinct from the

original.

Courts have divided fair use into productive fair use and reproductive fair use.

Productive use adds original expression, taking from the base work to reduce the cost but adding
to the number of works in culture. Reproductive works add little or no original content, reducing
the value of the base work and merely increasing the number of copies.
The derivative works
promoted by the statutory license must be productive uses of the base work in order for society
to benefit more than the artist loses. Thus, the statutory license should only apply to works that
have sufficient independent originality. This originality requirement would give a comfortable
distance between the two works in the marketplace and maximize the net gain to society. This
would also give some clarity to the disagreement in the courts as to how much originality
is
0

required for copyright protection of a derivative work made from a public domain work.14

Merely giving a vague requirement such as "sufficient originality" would visit the
problems of the fair use defense on a wider range of works. The same ambiguity would increase
the danger and, thus, the cost for a derivative work author. On the other hand, being too rigid in
the definition is never a good idea where the very purpose is increasing variety and uniqueness in
art. Some leeway must be given to the courts for interpretation of facts that are not predictable.
The best way to define derivative works loosely while still providing peace of mind is to give

definitive answers for specific situations, and a general guide for the unforeseen.
The few truly low-creativity works, like direct coying, verbatim duplication in a
different material 4 1 , verbatim duplication in a different scale' , and any other specific examples
determined by Congress, would not qualify. For the middle ground, the determination is based
on the purpose of the statutory license. The work must add to the number works available to the
public culture, and it should not displace the demand for the base work without altering that
demand. The derivative work's effect on the value of the base work is not relevant ; the
concern is that the derivative work is only supplanting the unchanged demand for the original.
This guide would probably exclude compilations of entire works. While this is
unfortunate, as the commentary and selection of a collection can provide a great value to culture,
such a limitation is necessary to maintain the incentive for artists. Further consolation can be
gained from the fact that much of the value, though none of the convenience, can be gained by
publishing the commentary without the entire original works,
and also that this use is still
1 44
permitted when the base works fall into the public domain.
The determination of price for the license is the other crucial factor. Professor Ginsburg
advocates using a "ceiling rate" which would prevent the base work owner from making their
asking price so high as to be a de facto abject denial, but would also allow the parties to
bargain. 145 The advantage of this is that it allows the parties to adjust the price to match the
particularities of the use and the fluctuation of the market. 4 6 If the bargaining proves fruitless,
139

Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerationsin the IntellectualProperty Protectionof

Software, 24 J. Legal Stud. 321, 360 (1995).
140 This is not to suggest that the definition would be binding outside the statutory
license, but
courts would be free to adopt it for other uses.
141 See L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
142 See Alva v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
143 If a parody awakens the public to the undesirable aspects of the base work, this would
decrease its value, but it would not displace the demand for it in a way that was not permitted.
144 An event that hopefully will occur, despite what current trends suggest.
145 Ginsburg, supra note 137, at 1932.
141 Id. at 1933.
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then the parties would be able to request a judicial determination of a fair rate. Professor
Ginsberg also mentions a system where the final offers from the parties are a binary choice for
the court. This would discourage a party from making an unreasonable offer, since the court will
not select that party's offer.
Taking the last suggestion first, the incentive to propose a reasonable offer only exists if
the other side proposes a reasonable offer. If the court only has two choices, an equally rational
strategy is to both submit unreasonable offers and hope that the court will choose your windfall
over theirs. More problematic is the fact that the very idea of broad negotiations that must fall
back to judicial determinations eradicates much of the value sought by a statutory license. The
transaction cost is still high, as each side has a clear incentive to pay for costly professionals to
negotiate on their behalf in a courtroom. That incentive becomes a necessity once the other side
does so. The expense and time of a court case still would loom over the potential derivative user.
Most troubling is that the goals of Professor Ginsburg's ceiling rate system appear to not require
the system.
As seen in the way artists have used the mechanical license, setting an actual rate in the
statutory license still allows the parties to negotiate, adjust for specific facts of the use, and open
up the works to use by third parties. The mandatory license compels cooperation, but not use of
the statutory license. The strictness of the license is an incentive to come to terms while relying
on the statutory license as a fall back option.
Like the mechanical license, the CARPs would have the duty of setting the rate schedule
of the derivative works statutory license. The goal in setting the price would be to set it low
enough that the derivative license is available to a wide number of disparate authors, while
setting it high enough that authors will still produce the base works without delay. This will
likely need to incorporate a number of variables. A "smaller" use can't cost the same as a
"larger" use or else the calculus will skew toward large uses. The most appropriate standard upon
which to base the rates would be cost per "impressions." 4 7 For most commercial uses this
would be the number of units sold. This also, however, has the flexibility to deal with temporary
licenses of works, public exhibitions, or other uses which don't fit the lump sum direct sale
model. Additionally, the unique markets that exist for different forms of media must be
reflected. If people simply won't pay as much for a song as a video game, the cost can't be the
same.
The user who wants to take advantage of the statutory license for derivative works, but
can not identify the copyright holder with due diligence would put the license fees into a trust
fund for when the author sought payment. If the author did not appear within a reasonable
amount of time, the user could regain those fees.
The license should be clear that it does not replace or displace any other available
defense, such as fair use or the First Amendment. These rights belong to the American public
and continue unabated. For those who feel their case makes risking the ambiguity of these
defenses worth the total avoidance of cost, they can still choose that path. However, as the
license must be exercised before publication, that choice is binding. The license should also
require that the work be labeled with a clear declaration of the identity of the author or source.
This will make sure that trademark law will prevent consumer confusion.
The drafting of a statutory license is controversial and necessarily heavy handed. It is not
to be used lightly. In the case of derivative works, however, there is a real possibility of
147

This concept is taken from the Internet where advertisers pay based on the number of times a

web page is loaded with their ad.
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American culture stagnating or even shrinking. Statutory licenses have proven to reduce
transaction costs while providing flexibility to the parties. A statutory license for derivative
works would make a strong and necessary statement that the people of America both value and
demand freedom of creativity.
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